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**Current migration
in
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Seria: PRACE MIGRACYJNE, nr 15

CURRENT MIGRATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Peculiar or integrating into European migration system?

Krystyna Romaniszyn

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1. Introduction

Recent history of mass migration shows that it stems from economic, political, and cultural factors that have pushed and pulled the masses. High living standards, demand for labour, guest worker systems, have been powerful pulling factors, while economic hardships, imbalance in economic development and living standards between the countries, unemployment have been the key, economic pushing factors. Similarly, liberal immigration policies, protection of human rights in welfare states have pulled migrants in, while political unrest, exclusive immigration policies have pushed them out. Besides xenophobia, racism, intolerance, consumption standards, tradition of migration may be seen as cultural pushing factors, while tolerance and acceptance of newcomers have the pulling effect. The asymmetry between economic and political push-pull factors, in a given country, facilitates clandestine labour migration. For instance, demand for cheap labour matched with exclusive immigration policies and/or the lack of adequate regulations has resulted in clandestine labour migration in southern European countries. In Central and Eastern European countries observable migration patterns have been an outcome of the transformation processes initiated at the beginning of the 1990s. Emergence of a new migratory space in this part of Europe presents a pressing problem, both theoretically and practically.

This paper begins by outlining the status of research on migration in Central and Eastern Europe, and by presenting the general migratory flows experienced by the region. It aims at highlighting the problem of emergence of new migratory space in Europe. Then follows a discussion on the usefulness of existing perspectives for the explanation of the phenomenon.

2. The current status of migration research

Intensification and diversification of recent migratory flows in Central and Eastern Europe have resulted in a number of studies undertaken by sociologists, economists, demographers, and other representatives of social sciences. The research has highlighted a broad range of topics and types of movements experienced in the region. There have been registered: transit migration, legal and illegal; irregular inflows of Asian nationals; short, and long-time labour migration, legal and clandestine; semi-legal and illegal petty-trade; mobility of the highly skilled; asylum seekers' and refugees' inflows; trafficking in women for prostitution; repatriation of ethnic groups. Some of the enumerated belong, in fact, to the same category of movement, diversified by the researchers for scientific or other reasons. This is the case of transit, and irregular migration of Asian nationals; the latter can be well included in the former category. The example reveals difficulties encountered with precise, commonly accepted identification of the phenomena. This can be assigned to their complexity, but also to the lack of theoretical thinking. A strong effort is required to formulate comprehensive definitions, and to develop and test novel theories. Nevertheless, a uniform body of migration theory or fully comprehensive definitions cannot be worked out due to complexity of the studied reality, and partiality of our perception (Niżnik 1979). We have already witnessed plurality of migration theories and, as I assume, this is inevitable effect of the two stated factors (Romaniszyn 1996, 1997). Shortly, pluralism of theoretical thinking, apparent also in migration studies, results from the complexity of the phenomenon.

Methodology employed involves a wide range of data gathering methods: from qualitative to qualitative ones, supplemented with analysis of statistics and interviews with experts. In effect, variety of data have been gathered and analysed, such as statistics/archival documents, in-depth interviews guided by targeted questionnaire, ethnosurvey and survey data, media reports. The latter appear as a novel source of information on migration flows, especially on the clandestine migration. The data have been systematised and discussed in the frameworks of a number of theories. Theoretical context for analyses have provided: functional 'push-pull' model; micro structural approach (migrants network theory); economic sociology (the moral economy of trade); an institutional approach. Still numerous authors of purposeful studies on various aspects or cases of migration have restraint themselves from employing any theoretical framework. However, even these fully descriptive, empirical studies add to the knowledge of current migratory movements, as they can be utilised for constructing or supporting hypotheses and theories.

Two series of research on migratory flows within Eastern and Central Europe will be presented and discussed in this paper in more detail. One is an international project on migration carried out in Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine; the other is a study sponsored by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The former project was based on three data gathering methods: a contextual data analysis, a household survey based on random sample and in-depth interviews with chosen respondents. The contextual data was essential for drawing the sample, and for the analysis of the qualitative data; preliminary household survey findings were necessary for selection of respondents of in-depth interviews. Applied methodology allows for penetrating and thorough investigation of actual migration mechanisms and profile. However, it does not allow for nation-wide generalisations, the more so as the unit of analysis were chosen particular communities. Research agenda for this type of the research assumes its region-by-region implementation, if not completed it severely restricts generalisations. Furthermore the presented project would be completed providing a cross-cultural analysis of migration patterns, profiles and mechanisms, in the chosen countries, have been undertaken. This, however, has been missing so far.

Three types of IOM research have been carried out since the beginning of the 1990s, which have aimed at highlighting international migration in Eastern and Central Europe. Firstly, it was a representative research on profiles and motives of potential migrants, carried out in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Albania (IOM, 1993). Focus group sessions and face-to-face household interviews with randomly selected adults have been conducted in each of the countries. The insights provided by interviews with the focus groups, i.e. by the qualitative study, were used to design a targeted questionnaire for quantitative survey. Surveys involved 4,000 interviews carried out in 1992 in four countries: Albania (997); Bulgaria (1,103), Russia (1,000), and Ukraine (1,000). As a cross-cultural surveys it inevitably involved linguistic and cultural peculiarities, however, the reader is not fully informed how these problems were coped with. So far, only in Albania (IOM 1995b) and Bulgaria (IOM 1997b) the survey was repeated which has allowed to study the dynamics of the phenomenon; undoubtedly migratory flows need a constant screening. An apparent shortcoming of the surveys is exclusiveness of their locality; they have been carried out in the capital cities, hence profiles of potential migrants from provincial areas remained undiscovered. This may invalidate, to some extent, the findings.

Secondly, a number of researches were carried out on the two subjects: the transit migration in Central and Eastern Europe, and trafficking in women from this, and other regions, to the West. Transit migration studies were based on combined qualitative and quantitative methods: focus group discussions followed by in-depth interviews based on targeted questionnaire. In each country quotas and categories of transit migrants have been

fixed on the basis of the knowledge and assessment of the phenomenon, apparently without cross-national consultation. In result differences in categorisation of transit migrants were inevitable; the more so, as precise, commonly accepted definition of the phenomenon have not been worked out. Thus the studies carried out in Poland (IOM 1994b), the Czech Republic (IOM 1994c), Hungary (IOM 1994e), Bulgaria (IOM 1994a), Russia (IOM 1994d), and Lithuania (IOM 1997a) adopted their own stratified, purposeful sample aimed at seizing major categories and groups of migrants. This, as well as differences in the structure of each research, makes comparisons difficult; information provided by one research have been missing in another one. For instance, while in some studies petty-traders were regarded as transients, in others this category was either neglected, the Czech Republic case, or just mentioned, Russian case. This is also a side effect of the lack of comprehensive definition of transit migrants, commonly accepted and applied. Hence, closer co-operation and co-ordination between research teams would be essential; it should aim at unification of the research tools, vital for comparative analysis, and at working out methods which would allow to study and depict distinct features of the flows experienced by each country.

In all cases chosen localities of the research were capital cities; it does not allow wide generalisations since at other places, particularly near national borders, transit migration may be differently structured. Thus the problem of representatives arise. Due to the enumerated factors, the quotas, the localities, and the categorisation, and irregularity of the phenomenon, representativeness of the samples can only be presumed. Supplementary data made the research more sound.

Studies on trafficking in women also dealt with the problem of definition of the phenomenon. Again it has revealed insufficiency of theoretical interpretation of some new aspects of contemporary migration flows. Owing to the nature of this phenomenon the studies were based on the available statistics and interviews with trafficked women who sought police assistance, thus the question of their representatives is invalid. The research shows the links between trafficking and prostitution, they also provide an insight into correlation between trafficking and migration.

Presented list close the research on irregular migration of the Afghan asylum seekers to Hungary (IOM 1995d), and of Chinese migrants to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania (IOM 1995c). They further investigate transit migration in the region, and allow for raising issues for further investigation. The research were based on interviews with Afghan asylum seekers in Hungary and interviews with experts (no more detail on methodology were given in this case), and on face-to-face, informal interviews with Chinese migrants, randomly chosen within Chinese community in each of the three countries. Hence, again qualitative, 'unsound', methods where the only ones applicable, as is the case with wide range of contemporary migration flows.

Future efforts to depict, explain and predict migration flows within Central and Eastern Europe need more methodological harmonisation, and closer cross-national co-ordination. Nevertheless, the existing researches have laid down the basis for further investigations.

3. Migrations in Central and Eastern Europe: the Chosen Cases

3.1. Poland

3.1.1. Outflows from Poland

Mass emigration from Poland, both economic¹ and political, has over one hundred years history, and till present the country belongs to European sending nations. Last decade, 1980-1989, witnessed an unprecedented exodus of some 1,100-1,300 million people (Jaźwińska, E. & Okólski, M. 1996:28). Among emigrants were a significant percentage of higher educated: 6,6 per cent of officially recorded and 13 per cent of officially unrecorded migration (ibid.). A specific category of migrants was scientific personnel. Evidences indicate that between 1981 and 1991 Polish science and research institutions lost about a quarter of their human capital (Hryniewicz, et al. 1992); their emigration reached its peak in 1991. Since then it has played a secondary role in the mobility of scientific personnel, preceded by the intra-science domestic transfers (Fiejka 1997:9). This may indicate that on the whole the 'brain drain' process has slowed down. Since 1994 the inflow of human capital to Poland exceed the outflow. It resulted from the increase of emigration of poorly educated from Poland; they form 70 per cent of all emigrants. Another reason is that more immigrants than emigrants occupy managerial or professional posts at the time of registration (Okólski 1995:13).

1989 is considered to be the turning point for migration trends in Poland. In the 1990s the rate of emigration from the country has decreased, while the new forms of migration emerged such as shuttle migration, temporal labour migration, both legal and illegal. Numerous evidences suggests that in the 1990s the most popular migration strategy adopted by Polish citizens has been temporal, labour mobility, overwhelmingly clandestine². Besides traditional, westward, route of the labour migration from Poland a new, southern one was marked out by political emigration of the 1980s. It has led to Greece, Italy, to smaller extent to Spain.

Overwhelmingly clandestine these movements have been therefore "haphazard" in the sense that migrants take full, exclusive responsibility for their course and consequences. Typically of post-organised capitalism's migration patterns they have been heading for the capital or larger cities in the host countries: Vienna, Brussels, Paris, Rome, Athens, etc. Evidences show that chain migration and migration networks development to much extent determine these movements (Jaźwińska, E. & Okólski, M. 1996; Romaniszyn 1997). They are also "self-initiated"; i.e. not preceded by "the prior penetration by institutions of the stronger nation into those of the weaker sending ones" as Portes and Borocz (1989) put it.

Different kind of labour out-flows from Poland have been legal migration regulated by bilateral agreements signed by the governments. The new guest-worker system implemented in Germany provides for more active labour recruitment and more legal workers admitted from Poland. Categories eligible include project tied workers, seasonal workers, border commuters, 'new guest workers', and nurses. In practise, however, only seasonal workers have been employed in greater numbers, in 1993 the percentage was 79, in the following year 89 (Honekopp 1997:9). In 1992 the Poles made about 10 per cent of all immigrants in Germany, most recently reemigration of the Central and Eastern European migrants has increased

¹ In this paper I employ a broad category - 'economic migration' - which covers all types of economically motivated movements such as petty-trade, short-term, long-term labour, legal and clandestine.

² For instance see: Balcerzak-Paradowska (1994); Mydel, & Fassmann, (1997), Jazwinska, & Okólski, (1996).

simultaneously with immigration, suggesting prevalence of short-term labour migration (ibid. 4).

Deep penetrating research undertaken as a part of international Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian project (mentioned above) provides more insight into migration mechanisms and profiles in the studies communities in two regions of Poland (Podlasie and Śląsk Opolski). The basic findings the research has arrived at show:

- the persistence of established westward destination in the period of the research, different in each region;
- the prevalence of short-term migration in the towns and of long-term migration in rural communities in both regions;
- the decline of the age of migrants over time, in all communities;
- that the most recent migrants who move for the first time have significantly lower education level than predecessors, the finding contrasts with tendencies revealed by other, discussed below, studies;
- and that short-term migration continue to be the most frequent migration type in the 1990s which basically attracts young males.

Depicted tendencies proves that economic development achieved in Poland has determined better job and career opportunities for better educated, while young people with lower educated have lower chances for well paid jobs in the home country. Hence they get involved in short-term labour migrations, probably for additional funds. The persistence of established migratory routes and destinations results from the existence of migration networks. On the other hand, intensified travels abroad after 1989 resulted in the establishment of new networks.

Since the beginning of the 1990s Poland has also become a host of diverse categories of immigrants which include: asylum seekers, refugees, transit migrants, both legal and illegal, economic migrants who have been coming to trade, semi-legally or illegally, or to undertake jobs, again legally and illegally. The following section deals in more details with some of listed categories.

3.1.2. Inflows: Poland as a transit country³

The approximate lower limit of transit migrants in Poland is 100,000 persons annually; the single largest group probably form nationals of the former USSR, in 1993 alone some 8 million of the former USSR citizens entered the country (IOM 1994b: 10,12). At the beginning of the 1990s the volume of foreigners increased sharply; in 1992 almost 50 million foreign nationals entered Poland, the next year the number was over 60 million. Particularly numerous were the entries of Bulgarian, Romanian, and the former USSR citizens; the latter have already established migratory routes through Poland, and several major centres where they gather in greatest number. The two major transit routes that cross Poland go from Asian and African developing countries, and from the former communist countries, to the West. Germany chosen by 44,1 per cent of informants has been the most popular target country, followed by Scandinavian countries 18,6 per cent and the USA 15,1 per cent.

The volume of illegal entries into Poland must be very high since 27 per cent of informants declared to enter Poland illegally through Polish/Ukrainian border, 5,8 per cent

³ This section is based on the IOM (1994b) research. Collected data include 86 informal interviews conducted according to the guidelines; a focus group discussion; statistics; interviews with experts. Respondents were chosen randomly. Due to irregularity and often illegality of these movements representative sample has not been possible, thus the results allow for cautious generalisations.

probably did it, in 12,8 per cent cases character of entry was unknown (ibid. 44). Thus, only 54,6 per cent of the sample described their entry as legal. Also labour market offers both legal and illegal employment; almost all informants were illegally or legally employed, generally, in agriculture and construction. Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians be mostly involved in trade, Lithuanians have also undertaken paying jobs. In 1992 a total number of legally and illegally employed foreigners was between 50,000-100,000 persons. Additionally numerous, foreign petty-traders were making their earnings illegally or semi-legally. They have come mainly from bordering countries of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, some also from Lithuania; they from further afield: Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, generally has come from neighbouring countries (Wallace, et al. 1997:19; also see page 28). In Poland they buy clothes, cosmetics, food. Some Polish entrepreneurs have even developed production specifically for this export trade to the East.

Generally, transients seem to be young, single (38,37 per cent of the sample) or with family abroad (29,1), originating from upper and middle social strata status (53,5). Asylum seekers who were heading for the West through Poland were mostly the former Yugoslavia and USSR nationals, in 1993 their number was approx. 1,100 person (ibid. 34).

Romas' usual answer for migration incentive: "*because everybody does it*", shows that some (ethnic) groups may be driven by the example of the others. In such cases economic hardship is only the background of the decision. The number of Romas who consider emigration from Romania is around 150,000 annually; in 1993 in Poland alone their assessed number was 280,000 persons (ibid. 65). It means that although heading for Germany via Poland many of them prolong their stay adding to the volume of illegal migrants in Poland.

In fact, transients have been legal or illegal migrants in Poland; the research shows that 63.9 per cent informants have been staying in Poland up to one year, 23,25 per cent up to 3 years, and 12,79 per cent more than 3 years (ibid. 50). Liberal entry policies, porous borders, proximity to the West (Germany in particular), foreign diaspora, job opportunities, and tolerance of foreigners have been the main pulling factors. Besides an opportunity to establish contact with the Westerners or traffickers, to get information, to arrange documents and earn funds for further migration, make Poland additionally attractive.

Specific category of inflows for mobility of skilled persons - managers, experts and professionals - from Western countries. In Warsaw their number oscillate around 3,000 which exclude experts 'commuting' between their countries and Poland (Rudolph and Hillmann, 1997:63). The research⁴ showed that mobility of the highly skilled has been institutionalised⁵ partially by European political organisations (various EU programmes), and partially by the strategies of large companies which internationalise their business. Mobility of the freelance foreign experts, English teachers, consultants, appears less institutionalised, as they move due to the social networks operation. It is doubtful whether inflows of the highly skilled to Poland, and other countries of the region, has been an 'inverse brain drain' (ibid. 62) since these migrants most probably will not settle, and will not join local elites. Their volume will rather shrink because of their replacement by local experts, and the expansion of the new communication forms. The access for foreigners to economic sectors in Poland is segmented according to ethnicity. As a rule, Europeans and Americans have been employed as specialists

⁴ The investigation involved semi-structured interviews with high level managers in some 50 multinational companies/joint ventures were conducted, supplemented by interviews with experts, managers and professionals (Rudolph and Hillmann 1997).

⁵ The authors have found the concept of international migrant institutions more relevant for the analysis of the mobility of skilled labour than 'classical' network approach which places emphasis on individual factors.

and consultants, while Asian nationals hold executive positions in sectors in which they invest, e.g. restaurants, trade companies (IOM 1994b: 29).

3.1.3. Conclusions

As shown, Poland remains a European sending nation, at the same time it has become a target country for labour migrants, petty-traders, both legal and illegal, and to much smaller extent for refugees, more numerous coming from Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and the Balkan Bulgaria. Poland has also become an important transit country for legal and illegal transit migrants of European and non-European origin. Presented studies reveal the importance of migration networks in directing migration flows both from, and into Poland. Migrants into Poland are driven by economic incentives; future development of these movements will depend on economic well being of the countries involved. To large extent migration into Poland is a side effect, and a prise, of the EU exclusive immigration policies. Migrants who come to Poland have been able to set off when the guest work projects had been closed, and hence many of them have been unable to move to the West.

3.2. The Czech Republic

3.2.1. Inflows: the Czech Republic as a transit country⁶

210 million border crossings to the Czech Republic in 1993 makes this country the most frequently visited in the 'buffer zone' region. The majority of registered foreigners have long-term residence permits; for instance in 1993 31,072 out of all 46,596 foreigners possessed permanent residence permits (IOM 1994c: 5). The number of illegal border crossings has also risen dramatically from some 19,000 in 1991 to over 30,000 in 1992, and over 40,000 in the following year. In 1993 citizens of the former Yugoslavia (57,5 per cent), Bulgaria (10,9 per cent), and Romania (9,4 per cent) who, generally, have tried to pass into Germany made majority of attempts. Very few request of asylum have been submitted in the Czech Republic since asylum seekers who cross the country prefer to have asylum in Germany.

Transit migration to the West form a category of inflows; the volume of this irregular movement has been estimated through the study of the apprehended at the German/Czech border. In 1993 alone the inflow was estimated between 100,000-140,000 persons (ibid. 2). The very small number of citizens of the former USSR apprehended suggest that they may chose another route, most likely *via* Poland. Apart from the Ukrainians, Georgians and Armenians very few citizens of the former USSR have been coming to the Czech Republic.

28 per cent interviewed, alleged, transit migrants had definite plans to go to the West, in particular to Germany, and the USA; but much more, 39 per cent, had no definite plans for further migration nor a chosen target country. Some of the undecided may find their way to the West, others may return home, both may prolong their stay in the Czech Republic looking for the new opportunities, and becoming *de facto* immigrants. In both categories Albanians, Bulgarians, Croatians, Romanians have dominated, among those who definitely wanted to go home (14 per cent) were Georgians, Vietnamese, and Ukrainians. Thus Albanians and

⁶ This section is based on the IOM (1994c) report. Data gathering methods included: in-depth interviews (64) with randomly chosen migrants; interviews with focus groups, asylum seekers, and experts; supplemented by statistics' analysis. Due to irregularity of the phenomenon the sample cannot be seen as representative; the results have illustrative nature.

Romanians have been strongly determined to reach the West, in contrast with Ukrainians and Vietnamese who may be viewed as economic migrants, not transients. A typical informant was a young, single male, originating from either the middle social strata (41,8 per cent) or from the lower strata (42,9 per cent) (ibid. 23).

High percentage (40 per cent) of jobless respondents suggests that they were about to leave or get funds from some sources (relatives abroad?); as such they might have been real transients. Among the employed 11 per cent worked legally, 12 per cent illegally; 15 per cent were trading legally, 14 per cent illegally; and 8 per cent had their own business. There have already been traces of ethnic job distribution; the majority of Ukrainians were manual workers employed at construction, textiles, bakeries; Chinese had their 'ethnic businesses'; Vietnamese were involved in legal and illegal trade. Chinese, Vietnamese and African nationals preferred self-employment, trying to find economic niches for them selves in the Czech economy. Thus by far they have been more entrepreneurial and self-dependent then migrants from eastern Europe, most likely employed illegally as manual workers have in construction, textile industry, and services. In Prague - the most attractive place for traders - about one third were Vietnamese and Chinese. In early 1990s the street trade was controlled by the Bosnians, the Serbs and Croats, the Russians and Ukrainians. The Armenians and Georgians like the Chinese were mainly wholesalers (Wallace, et al. 1997:20/21).

Most numerous Chinese migration into the Czech Republic took place in 1993-1995⁷; in effect the Chinese community had increased in years 1990-1994 from 94 to 2,907 persons⁸, and unofficial estimates suggest the number of illegal Chinese on some 20,000 persons (IOM 1995c: 7). Many of these migrants have been in business activities ranging from a market stall to a restaurant or wholesale company. The government policy toward investors served as an effective pulling factor. A modest level of investment needed to set up a company attracted numerous Chinese investors, some of whom might set up 'phantom' companies aimed at transporting migrants to the West, such cases have been reported from Hungary and Romania. Actually a tiny number of apprehended Chinese may confirm suggestions that sophisticated network of Chinese restaurants, Chinese shops or Chinese laundries serves smuggling people to the West. Prague has already been regarded as an important transit point for illegal migrants, especially the Chinese (ibid. 23).

12 per cent of the sample (IOM 1994c) crossed the borders illegally: mostly Albanians, *Bosnians*, Romanians, and Vietnamese, who employed traffickers or bribery to reach the country. It confirms the importance of traffickers' networks for illegal migration flows. The main established routes go from Ukraine or Hungary to Slovakia and then the Czech Republic. The sale of invitations and tourists vouchers to Slovakia which take place in Ukraine and Russia has facilitated migratory flows along this route.

The migration networks based upon an established diaspora in the West and upon the ethnic communities in the Czech Republic function as a pulling factors, which effectively direct current migration flows despite all the barriers, installed. Other detected informal structures that facilitate international movements were short-term, instrumental networks for trading, brokering, contract work, smuggling and trafficking. Based on immediate needs they are commercial in character (ibid. 32).

⁷ More light on Chinese migration to the country put the IOM (1995c) research based on 60 informal interviews, 20 in each capital city, carried out in 1995 with randomly chosen Chinese migrants; it was supplemented with interviews with experts. Sample cannot be seen as not fully representative.

⁸ The number has been assessed on the basis of the residence permit data which show permit holders on a particular date without registration the flow onto and off the inventory. It does not allow to monitor the turnover of persons, i.e. how long do they stay there.

3.2.2. Conclusions

The outflows generated by the Czech Republic in the 1990s have been very low, while the volume of inflows has been high (Okólski 1997b:17/18). Analysed data allows assuming that the country has experienced two categories of inflows from the East: of the transients, and of the economic migrants involved in trade and labour, both legal and illegal. High percentage of informants (60 per cent) who have been working, trading or running their own business can be depicted as short-term economic migrants. The transients have been attracted by the proximity of the West, Germany in particular and liberal entry requirements. The main pulling factors for economic migrants, many of which were Ukrainians, Vietnamese and Chinese have been job opportunities and possibility to start the business. Most probably, the latter category has also been there temporally, including the Chinese entrepreneurs.

3.3. Hungary

3.3.1. Inflows: Hungary as a transit country⁹

Migration to Hungary seems to stabilise at a lower level after an initially rapid rise in the early 1990s. However, in 1993 the number of the arrivals of foreign citizens reached 40 599 million. The most numerous have been Yugoslavians (13,715 in 1993), and Romanian citizens (6,699 in 1993). Reported decline may partially result from stricter legislation introduced, regarding the entry and the stay. The side effect of the restrictions might have been illegal border crossing. In 1991 29,000 foreign citizens were apprehended; the majority wanted to leave Hungary at the Austrian border, others tried to go through Slovenia to Italy or through Slovakia to Germany?

33 per cent of the sample were familiar with Hungary prior to their arrival, and actual migration had been preceded by an intensive 'trial period' of a series of seasonal journeys. Transients have also been heading for country where they have connections. This only confirms the importance of micro-level links in structuring of migration flows.

The majority of the sample were young male, either high or low educated, mostly skilled workers (32,2), students (18,2) and professionals (12,4) originated from urban areas. 47 per cent would like to continue going West, if they had the chance, but only 23 per cent have solid plans, among them mainly asylum seekers and younger people. The Russians and the Ukrainians were mostly determined to continue migration to Western Europe or the USA, while the Vietnamese, the Mongolian and the Romanian did not planned further migration (IOM 1994e: 44). The finding contrasts with results achieved in the Czech Republic where the most determined to continue migration were, among others, Romanians, and the least inclined were, among others, Ukrainians and Russians. It demonstrates that either each of the two transit countries have been chosen by differently motivated migrants of the same ethnic background or the difference results from sampling error.

⁹ This section is based on the IOM (1994e) research. It resulted in: 150 in-depth interviews with potential transit migrants chosen randomly; focus group interviews with some 40 person; and analysis of statistical data. Due to irregularity of the phenomenon the sample cannot be seen as representative, and results are only of illustrative nature.

Difficulties with obtaining foreign visas, and financial difficulties have postponed departure of some migrants, and have made them work. The interviewees have worked as labourers, legal and illegal, employed in construction, agriculture, and retail; as small traders; as businessmen often owners of the trade firms. Those with little chances for further legal migration to the West, mostly Arabic-speaking migrants and Chinese, have been working, legally and illegally or had their own enterprises. Unofficial estimates suggest that some 70,000-100,000 foreigners have been illegally employed, majority of who have been Romanians, working as unskilled workers; Ukrainians and Russians have also appeared in greater number working illegally in entertainment industry. Petty-traders have been citizens of Romania, Ukraine, Russia, China and Vietnam; and as a rule they stay for a short while (*ibid.* 29). Besides Chinese who operated a wholesale trade, selling cheap goods from the Far East, other dominant nationalities were Bulgarian and Serbian (Wallace, et al. 1997:23).

Chinese form a specific category of migrants, some three-quarters of them arrived in Hungary between 1990 and 1991; in 1991 alone 27,330 Chinese entered the country. This mass inflow was stopped after introduction of visa requirement in 1992; the number of entries in 1992 was 10,128, in the next year it was 7,885, and in 1994 8,979 (IOM 1995c: 8). Besides liberal entry policy also the policy of attracting investors pulled in Chinese, as some 11,000 US\$ capital was enough to set up a company. Some of the enterprises were 'phantom' ones aimed at smuggling migrants to the Western Europe. Indeed, the dynamics of their movements through Hungary must have been high since in 1993 unofficial estimates put the number of Chinese nationals in the country only around 3,000 to 10,000 persons.

More clues of the increase of transit movements through Hungary have been provided by the IOM study (1995d), which reports an increase in asylum applications from Afghans. This may be the first sign of their substantial westward movement, 'escorted' by traffickers. In 1995 there were 199 such cases, when compared to 1994 when only 30 applications were submitted (*ibid.* 4). Established trafficking routes go probably through Ukraine and Romania, another one from Bulgaria.

Outflows from Hungary have been very small (Okólski 1997b:18), nevertheless they exist. The Hungarian household panel survey on the individual's plans concerning labour migration, carried out in 1993 and 1994 has shown that for Hungarians the most popular target countries have been Germany and Austria (Hars 1997). Early 1990s have also witnessed an increase of Hungarian migration to the West; in 1990 43,500 Hungarian citizens went to EU countries, in 1992 the number has grown to 66,412 persons (*ibid.* 18).

3.3.2. Conclusions

Hungary like the Czech Republic is basically net immigration country in the region. In the early 1990s it has received a considerable number of migrants from Eastern Europe and Asia. Labour migrants, transient migrants, and petty-traders have build the structure of these inflows. Implementation of more restrictive entry and stay regulations effectively curbed the legal inflows, at the same time the inflows of illegal transients and other migrants may be augmented by the activity of traffickers' networks.

3.4. Lithuania

3.4.1. Outflows from Lithuania¹⁰

Adopted broad definition of 'migration' as a non-tourist, non-recreational international mobility for up to 7 days or less, enabled investigators to include all types of mobility, irrespective of their duration. Thus the research disclosed that majority of current Lithuanian migrants have been relatively young males, highly educated. This have led to temporal 'brain waste', since abroad they usually undertake jobs below their qualifications. This also means that their involvement in these movements is temporal and will stop as soon as the immediate economic necessity is over. The first to go abroad have been white-collar workers who have marked the routes for others, as was the case elsewhere (Romaniszyn 1996).

Firstly, the research has disclosed the increase of the number of migrants and frequency of movements from Lithuania. However, the majority, over 80 per cent, has been short-term trips, which do not exceed one month (Sipaviciene 1997). Partially they have been commerce trips facilitated by low customs, weak border control, and disparity in prices. In years 1992-1995 they alone accounted for 35.6 per cent of foreign trips, followed by short-term labour movements, 25.5 per cent, mainly for jobs in construction and manufactures. There is little doubt that these movements: petty-trade and short-term labour, have been illegal or semi-legal, and the research revealed that personal networks facilitated them. Secondly, fundamental characteristic detected in the years 1992-1995 is the decline of the long-term migration, i.e. exceeding one year. Hence, the two migrations pattern which currently dominate: petty-trade and short-term labour aims at immediate economic benefits, and does not lead to emigration and settlement in the host countries. However, there are evidences of illegally prolonged residence of Lithuanian citizens visiting certain Western countries with short-term visas (Sipaviciene 1997:27). Whether this will lead to their settlement is an open question, but it seems that making a 'quick' additional income is a common and base migration incentive of the majority of Lithuanian migrants. Emigration from Lithuania in the early 1990s had a clear ethnic character and has manifested features of decolonisation process; hence sudden increase has been followed by sudden decline (ibid. 29). For instance, the ethnic structure of emigrants in 1994 was build by 61.3 per cent of Russians, 10.6 per cent of Ukrainians, 10.1 per cent of Belarusians, and only by 4.7 per cent of Lithuanians (ibid. 31).

Neighbouring Poland is the most preferred target country for petty-traders and labour migrants, followed by Germany, Scandinavian countries, and the USA; the latter being chosen by long-term migrants. Frequent and hence constant movements of economic migrants, augmented by development of migration networks link the countries.

Thirdly, eastward migration from Lithuania to the former USSR, especially Russia, has diminished, while westward outflows have drastically increased and stabilised on a rather high level. One explanation would be that given the fact that majority of movements from Lithuania have been commerce trips and short-term labour they have been heading for countries which offer better job and earning opportunities. However, in the Ukrainian case migration to Russia have increased in recent years. Does it mean that migrant workers and petty-traders from Ukraine have better opportunities there then those from Lithuania? It seems unlikely, some

¹⁰ This section is based on the Lithuanian part of the international project on migration trends in the region. Implementation of household survey and in-depth interviews provided both quantitative and qualitative data, supplemented by contextual material. Interviews were carried out in 4 non-randomly selected Vilnius districts where variety of migration types have been detected. Nevertheless, investigations carried out in the chosen communities do not provide the basis for broad generalisations.

other reasons - historical?, political?, cultural?, geographical? - May have influence and direct these flows, and hence deserve investigation.

Remittances received by Lithuanians are basically spent on improving living conditions/dwelling and on consumption goods. This pattern of spending money earned abroad seems very common in CEE region, proving that migration is a function of both economic necessity and consumption desires, fashions, and obligations (Romaniszyn 1996, 1997).

3.4.2. Inflows: Lithuania as a transit country¹¹

Presented study deals with illegal transit migrants already apprehended when passing through Lithuania to the West. Research point out that there have been a decrease in the number of illegal migrants apprehended which may indicate stabilisation of transit movements through Lithuania on a certain level. In the year of highest apprehension, 1995, 7,289 illegal migrants were caught, while till August 1996 the number was 1,575. Immediate, objective causes facilitating these inflows were the lack of agreement between CIS countries on visas, porous borders, and tremendous build-up of South Asian transit migrants in Russia, with an estimated 200,000 illegal aliens in temporary residence in Moscow at any one time.

A steady grow of Sri-Lankan and Bangladeshi, rapid growth of Afghans followed by Indian, Pakistani and other Asian nationals detained in years 1992-1996 suggests numerous involvement of these nationals in the movement. Major detected migratory routes go through Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. This may be attributed to the relatively easy entry procedures in Ukraine and Russia as a short-term visa can be obtain at the airport, and to existence of the network of traffickers there. Since many apprehended have been crossing the Lithuanian/Polish border, Poland seems to be the next transit country on the way to the West.

The major target country was Germany, followed by the USA, Denmark and Sweden, and altogether some 59 per cent of informants had either relatives or friends in the destination country which again points at migration networks as a powerful pulling factor. Two main intertwined incentives were of political and economic nature.

The research proves that traffickers may be individuals, known or unknown to their clients, or agencies, often formally tourist agencies, who set international, co-ordinated networks which can be approached at any stage of the journey to the West. High costs of their service explain the high proportion of the well off among the clients; others need to earn in the transit countries or collect necessary funds at home, or get from the West. Recorded procedure that the whole family collects money in order to send one representative to the West, usually the most educated young male, who in turn is to organise their migration (28) proves that migration decision is often collectively made, as the new economic theory of migration states.

Introduction of refugee status evaluation procedure in Lithuania - suggested by the EU - which would allow returning asylum-seekers coming from Lithuania back to this country may reduce its attraction as a transit country. However, the question remains who would bear the costs?

¹¹ This section is based on the IOM (1997a) report. Altogether 112 interviews were held with non-European illegal migrants detained at Lithuanian detention centre. Findings were supplemented with data obtained from the Ministry of Interior on 501 non-CIS illegal migrants detained in the country between September 1995 and July 1996. Despite the fact that the sample was not representative cautious generalisation on transit migration in the country can be made.

3.4.3. Conclusions

Out-migration from Lithuania stems from economic hardships, and growing consumption aspirations. The increase of short-term labour, and commercial trips undertaken by numerous white collar workers clearly indicate that this economic migration has been an 'emergent resolution' which will stop as soon as the immediate necessity is over. Meanwhile shuttle trips and labour movements have established migration networks that link Lithuania with the receiving countries, Poland in the first place. In the future they may serve as channels of economic and other co-operation. Emigration potential in Lithuania is rather low. Significant inflows experienced by the country in recent years have been illegal transit movements of non-Europeans from the developing countries. They have been generated by both political unrest and economic deprivation and augmented by the traffickers' networks. Reported stabilisation of these flows may be temporal; transit migration through CEE will not stop sooner than circumstances, which amplify it.

3.5. Ukraine

3.5.1. Outflows from Ukraine¹²

The research findings allow to assume that current out-migration from Ukraine is basically economic, clandestine, and made of the two types of movements: petty-trade and labour migration, short-term (few weeks) and long-term (above one month). Objective push-factors have been imbalance in living standards between Ukraine and the neighbouring states; fall in real incomes; rising prices; sweeping inflation; growing unemployment. The majority of migrants have been young, with higher education, without dependants, most often jobless, self-employed, and students.

In all studied communities there has been a substantial increase of westward migration since the late 1980s. Analysis of first and last trips of active migrants shows predominance of short-term westward movements, aimed at earning a living, and/or collecting funds for consumption, investment, or further migration. Last, westward, commercial trips constituted 77,2 per cent movements from Kiev, 84,6 per cent from Chernivtsi, and 59,5 per cent from Prylbychi. Last trips' analysis shows that the employed more often resort to migration which confirms that it has been treated as a source of additional income; furthermore, employment helps to bear the risk involved in these illegal or semi-legal movements, and provides for initial capital. However, the proportion of jobless among active migrants was also high (Chernivtsi 28.4 per cent, Prylbychi 21,6 per cent, Kiev 13,9 per cent, see: Pirozhkov 1996, Tab.5.6). Overwhelming majority of highly educated migrants in clandestine economic migration leads

¹² This section is essentially based on the Ukrainian part of international project; Household survey (440) and case studies (22) were supplemented with contextual documents. Survey was conducted in randomly selected households in Kiev (200), Chernivtsi (120), and Prylbychi village (120). The level of out-migration in chosen communities was moderate, since only 27 per cent of households in Kiev, 38 per cent in Chernivtsi, have migrants. It seems that communities those close to the border with Russia are especially missing in the research. In terminology and categorisation introduced migrants of the years 1975-1991 were named 'inactive', those mobile in years 1992-1994, 'active' ones; 'near abroad' means migration to the former USSR, while 'far abroad' to other foreign countries. In addition data from the IOM (1993) report has been utilised in the section.

to temporal 'brain waste'; and it may be assumed that they will withdraw when the acute necessity is over while marking the routes for others.

Poland has been the main target country for Ukrainian petty-traders, both "the beginners" and "the veterans", since the late 1980s till present. In years 1987-1991 48.7 per cent of first - overwhelmingly commercial - trips abroad from Kiev, and 32.8 per cent from Chernivtsi had been made to Poland; also in years 1992-1994 49.4 per cent of first, short-term, commercial trips from Kiev, and 35 per cent from Chernivtsi headed for this country (ibid, Tab.4.4). Similarly, in rural Prylbychi westward economic migration had increased from 36 cases in years 1987-1991 to 44 in years 1992-1994, majority of which headed for Poland. In this community, however, petty-traders who had dominated in the early 1990s, in years 1992-1994 constituted 'only' 52.3 per cent of those who moved 'far abroad' for the first time, while 38.6 per cent went to undertake jobs, mainly in construction and services (ibid. Tab.4.7). This suggests that commerce trips undertaken by 'pioneers' have led to 'exploration' of Poland and job opportunities there; obtained information and contacts have allowed the followers to go 'directly' to work. Nevertheless, petty-trade movements remained the most numerous first trips. Also 48.8 per cent of last, 'overnight' trips, and 32.5 per cent of last short-term trips from Kiev headed for Poland, in Chernivtsi the percentages were 41.3 and 23.3, respectively. In Prylbychi 83.3 per cent of last 'overnight' trips, 60 per cent of last short-term movements, and 90.5 per cent of last long-term migration headed for Poland (Ibid. Tab.5.8). It suggests that constantly a significant number of the Ukrainian migrants 'initiate' into international mobility with short-term, commercial movement to Poland which provides them with funds, information, and experience needed for further movements, again to Poland or somewhere else.

Other target countries for both first and last short-term, commercial trips made in the studied period have been Turkey and Romania; long-term economic migration have been constantly heading for Germany and the USA. Besides in the years 1987-1991 first, long-term migration headed for the Czech Republic, Greece, and China, while in years 1992-1994 Italy and Canada have been chosen (ibid. 84, 87). Long-term, active migrants' last migration headed for Canada, Israel, but also for Russia, Poland and the Czech Republic. As shown, in the whole studied period petty-traders, both the 'beginners' and the 'veterans' use the same, well established routes to Poland, Romania, and Turkey, while in recent years longer-term labour migrants have 'supplemented' well established routes which have led to Germany and the USA, with new ones which lead to Israel, Canada, Russia, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Spreading of labour migration from the Ukraine suggests the intensification of the phenomenon.

Westward petty-trade migration from Ukraine has shown specific dynamics, recently it has become a 'profession' of mostly young men, jobless at home, who intensify the number of trips and the volume of cargo, and for whom this is the main or single occupation and source of income¹³. Beside professionals, 'amateur' petty-traders, mostly women in their thirties and forties, operate; their number reportedly has diminished due to the lowering of the profit of the occasional trips. Frequency of 'amateur' trips did not exceed four, and these movements have been restricted to neighbouring countries, while 'professionals' go as far as Italy, China, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates. Detected,

¹³ Commercial trips become more specialised as "groups of traders hire lorries, cars... Contacts established abroad with wholesalers or producers with whom 'professionals' agree in advance about the terms, costs and the volumes... allow them to economise on time. ... The efficiency of operation rises... when some of them engage in merchandise supply and others in sale" (Pirozhkov 1996:161) which, by the way depicts developed migration networks.

newly developed pattern is that a wife starts petty-trade trips and her husband takes the business over. Migration networks, seemingly not investigated comprehensively in the survey, need further investigation; the interviews have already provided evidences of migration networks development¹⁴. It is also very unlikely that 'professional' petty-traders can operate without, and outside the networks since they have been involved in the semi-legal or illegal activity, and hence need self-protection (Wallace, et al. 1997).

The Ukrainian labour migrants, most often undocumented, undertake lower-wage "unskilled, non-prestigious work which is neglected, despite unemployment, by natives" and generally "are employed by private small firms" (ibid. 173) - exactly as the dual market theory explains¹⁵. They get jobs in construction, agriculture, services; women have been doing housekeeping, baby-sitting, and have been looking after aged persons. It seems that clandestine work abroad has been perceived as humiliating, immediate necessity; as one Ukrainian informant put it: *"One or two more years and we will rise and the Poles will realise that the Ukrainians have enough job in their homeland, and will not go to work for them."* (Babiński 1997:254-5). For the time being, however, economic migration is inevitable for many, especially young people who need to collect funds for one's own flat, as one of them explained: *"...earlier it was possible to receive a free flat from the state...to get free education and medical service... Today the youth does not have such possibilities. Nobody will give us a free dwelling... A higher education is becoming paid..., to create a family and normal conditions for children one should have money"* (Pirozhkov 1996:114). It is worthy noticing that currently one-room flat in Ukrainian cities sells for 4,000-10,000 US\$ and an average salary do not exceed 50 US\$. Thus it is little wonder that remittances are partially used for consumption such as purchase of flat or car, and partially for investment, i.e. purchase of land, establishment of private firms (registered or not), majority of which are trade, manufacture, construction firms (ibid. 198). Indeed remittances obtained due to economic migration seem to be significant; just one survey conducted in 1993 at the western border showed that Ukrainian migrants trading in Poland earned 68 million dollars, according to the exchange rate of that period (ibid. 189).

In all three communities 'near abroad' migration, basically to Russia, had intensified in years 1992-1994 when compared with the late 1980s; 131 'active migrants' from Kiev went there, 54 from Chernivtsi, and 71 from Prylbychi. Growing attractiveness of Russia for economic migrants from Ukraine stems from lower travel expenses, no language difficulties, exchange rates, and job opportunities in construction and services. Thus the research shows that in recent years neighbouring Poland, to the west, and Russia, to the east, have become the two important target countries for Ukrainian economic migrants.

¹⁴ Citations listed below suggest development of migration networks: "a major source of information in organising both the first and last trips were relatives and friends" (Pirozhkov 1996:129); "migrants needed financial assistance during their stay abroad. In this situation they more often addressed friends and in some cases their foreign partners" (ibid. 131); "in Yugoslavia and Poland they used to stay for one-two nights at places of natives" (ibid. 160/161); "a lot of Poles made earnings by renting rooms to Ukrainian traders." (ibid. 166); "I was preparing thoroughly for my first trip: studied demand and established contacts with dealers. I also found assistance through business contacts of my husband. ... I do not sell myself, there is one man, dealer, who takes the whole party and carry it to a market where he has some persons selling various merchandise. They have 7-10 per cent of the profit." (ibid. 164) (underline added); "20 per cent of migrants from Chernivtsi and over 15 per cent from Kiev received support and aid including financial one from relatives and friends. The possibility of getting such support... is a sizeable argument for making decision to go abroad"; "Next year I went to Poland again. Having had a certain experience and addresses, I knew where to find a job." (ibid. 170).

¹⁵ The report further read: "Teams of builders from Ukraine construct villas for 'new Russians' in localities near Moscow, build dwelling districts in Prague and Brno and erect objects in Poland" (Pirozhkov 1996:173).

The research has also revealed that contemporary economic migration from Ukraine consists of two main categories of flows: the most popular commercial trips and short-term labour migration, and much less popular long-term labour movements, but on the whole labour migration potential seems to be moderate. Similar tendencies have been disclosed by an earlier research carried out on the representative sample (IOM 1993). Only 28.8 per cent Ukrainian respondents declared likelihood of short-term labour migration (IOM 1993:49), as much as 74 per cent would not migrate for a few years to work, and 82 per cent would not settle abroad (ibid. 51). It means that in Ukraine labour migration potential is moderate and emigration potential is low, despite great pessimism about the general conditions of the country, and the direction it is heading: *"There is no light at the end of the tunnel. It looks like everything is going down the drain"* - said one Ukrainian respondent (ibid. 47). Surprisingly enough 56 per cent respondents expressed likelihood of visiting another country as a tourist (ibid. 48) despite experienced hardships: 63 per cent assessed their material situation as worse (ibid. 41). Thus the questions arise how would they manage to go abroad as tourist? The answer seems simple: these have been commerce trips of petty-traders just labelled as tourist, and organised by tourist agencies. This proves correct the thesis of predominance of commercial trips and short-term movements from Ukraine. Those who declared likelihood of long-term labour migration were young, had technical training or were university graduates, were unemployed or students - hence, the proactive long-term migrants would be both young "desperate and young "optimists". The majority has chosen Germany, the USA, Canada and Australia - the destination also pointed out by the ethnosurvey; an important factor pulling in to the latter two countries might be well-organised Ukrainians communities there, which secure job and accommodation for the newcomers. To the contrary with ethnosurvey's findings, in the IOM research Poland was mentioned as a target country only by 7 per cent of people aged 18-20, and by aged 21-24 and 25-29, 2 per cent each. Greater popularity of Poland as a target country especially for petty-traders and short-term labour migrants revealed by the ethnosurvey might stem from the chosen localities which traditionally has been linked with Poland. This only confirms suggestion expressed about the limited representativeness of the ethnosurvey due to its exclusive concentration on the western parts of the country. Russia has not been mentioned as a target country in the IOM research most probably because this migration is the more recent phenomenon. An important reason of detected differences, which should be borne in mind, is the fact that IOM study measures potential movements while the ethnosurvey the actual ones.

3.5.2. Inflows: Ukraine as a transit country¹⁶

Since 1993 an estimated 17 million persons have crossed the Ukrainian borders. The number is relatively low when compared with 210 million borders crossing to the Czech Republic and 60 million to Poland. The more so as Ukraine has 'migrant friendly' legislation: visitors without visa or invitation are given three-day visa at the border. Majority of legal entries has been made from Russia. Majority (over 80 per cent) illegal migrants in Ukraine are those who have overstayed their visa. However, illegal inflows, of undetermined volume, to Ukraine from Hungary and Romania, heading for Poland as a next stop, have also been mentioned, unfortunately, no more attention has been given to them.

¹⁶ This section is based on the IOM (1994f) research. Altogether 462 interviews carried out, supplemented with statistics and interviews with experts. Respondents were chosen randomly according to quotas established to ensure that all important nationalities and types of migrants were interviewed. Due to irregularity of the phenomenon the sample was not representative, and results are only of illustrative nature.

Available statistics clearly show that the phenomenon of illegal western border crossing intensifies. Unfortunately precise meaning of employed euphemistic expression "the Western border" has not been specified. Is it Polish/Ukrainian or Ukrainian/Slovak border? It is meaningful that, according to the research, "the western border" pulls potential illegal transients, and the quickest, illegal migration and traffickers' networks have been found there. 43 per cent of informants with no fixed job have stayed there, probably ready for or illegal border crossing. In January 1994 alone, 1,455 migrants were apprehended when illegally crossing "the western border", of whom 83 per cent were from South East Asia and the Middle East. In 1993 the number was 17,614, when compared to only 78 illegal migrants caught in 1992 (IOM 1994f: 33). It proves that Ukraine has become an important transit country for Asian, and Arab-speaking nationals in their way to the West, most probably *via* Poland.

Transients have been identified as those who cross Ukraine quickly, and those who plan further migration meanwhile taking advantage of earning and social opportunities in Ukraine, e.g. setting up businesses, establishing contacts. No doubt traffickers are among those contacted. The research demonstrates that Ukraine is not only a transit country but also a country of temporal stay as 45,9 per cent of respondents were undecided when they will leave Ukraine. Also high percentage (41 per cent) have been running their own business or have been involved in across-the-border trade, and have used Ukraine, especially Kiev, as a base. The NIS nationals, Chinese and Vietnamese would travel to Poland, Slovakia, Austria, Italy and come back with goods for sale. Hence, these clandestine international petty-traders are short-term or long-term economic migrants who grasp advantage of low costs of living in Ukraine.

Majority of respondents was young, single males; originating from large cities, highly educated, in the home country they were either relatively well off or poor. The former was probably seeking better opportunities in advanced countries, the latter improvement of their material status. This confirms allegedly common rule, that migrants are either the well-off 'adventurers' or the poor 'desperate'.

38 per cent of respondents were pulled in to Ukraine by personal ties i.e. by family or friends living there. Second important reason for 36 per cent of informants were low costs of living. Convenient geographic location pulled in 20 per cent, and higher possibility of obtaining visa to the West 19 per cent of informants. The latter finding reveals how an information on migration opportunities, true or false, serves as a powerful pulling factor.

3.5.3. Conclusions

In Ukraine emigration potential seems moderate, while labour migration and shuttle, commercial trips have been the most popular, serving as a source of income or additional earnings. Migration is directed both westward and eastward; Poland is the main target country for shuttle trips and labour migration, others destinations have been Germany, the USA and Canada. Eastward flows have been heading for Romania and Turkey; the two well established target countries for petty-traders, recently Russia offers commercial and job opportunities. Besides Ukraine has also become the hub of illegal transit migration from the East and South to Western democracies; it seems that these flows direct mainly for Poland, as the next stop. The country also hosts a number of *de facto* economic migrants involved in international petty-trade. Some of these highly mobile migrants may prepare themselves for further migration, collecting funds, experience, information, and establishing contacts.

3.6. Bulgaria

3.6.1. Outflows from Bulgaria¹⁷

The first IOM (1993) report showed that in 1992 migration potential from Bulgaria was relatively low; only 28 per cent respondents confirmed likelihood of their short-term labour migration, 20 per cent said that their long-term labour migration was likely, and for 81 per cent their emigration was 'unlikely' (IOM 1993:49/51).

Three years later the research revealed higher dissatisfaction with the country's economic conditions than in 1992; over 80 per cent of respondents were convinced that thing is going in the wrong direction (over 40 per cent in 1992). This, however, did not lead to the growth of potential migrants. On the contrary, fewer have been seriously thinking about migration then in 1992. It may be that lower income made them less inclined to take the financial risk of migration, as one confessed: *'going to another country is a very uncertain undertaking'*. Also perceived social isolation and bad treatment of migrant workers in the West (IOM, 1997b: 6) may have discouraged many from planning migration. Finally, it may be that the most skilled, for whom migration was easiest, have already left. However, the fact that 74 per cent of respondents declared they would encourage their children to settle abroad, and 41 per cent would encourage them to go abroad to work is very symptomatic. It suggests that Bulgaria may become a country of postponed migration potential!

Potential migrants, in 1997, have been educated males under the age of 40, living in urban areas, often students and the unemployed, and the ethnic Turks. High proportion of higher educated among potential migrants would mean further outflow of the country's elite already significant; government figures suggest that some 6,000 scientists have emigrated since 1989 (ibid. 7). According to most recent census 500,000 Bulgarian residents have emigrated since 1990, and one study shows that over 30 per cent of emigrants were university or college graduates (ibid. 7). If jobs available for them were below their education level, this would be yet another case of 'brain waist' experienced by many countries of the CEE region.

Germany in Europe and the USA overseas have been the two constant, target countries preferred by potential labour migrants from Bulgaria in 1993 and 1997. However, proximity of Greek parallel economy has been pulling in potential, and no doubt, actual migrants. In years 1989-1993 1,162 Bulgarian citizens were apprehended at Bulgarian/Greek border which disclose popularity of illegal migration among Bulgarian (IOM 1994a: 21). Many potential migrants had a relative living abroad; it confirms the significance of family networks for international migration, which put into motion the chain migration mechanism.

¹⁷ This section is based on the IOM (1997b) research. It was a panel, representative survey, altogether 1,917 persons have been interviewed. Findings were supplemented with focus-groups interviews and statistics. Obtained data allow for cautious generalisations. Additionally data from the previous IOM (1993) research is utilised.

3.6.2. Inflows: Bulgaria as a transit country¹⁸

In contrary to above-mentioned countries Bulgaria have been witnessing a significant decrease of foreign visitors in the years 1990-1993. For instance in 1990 10,329,537 foreigners' came to the country while in 1993, the number has dropped to 8,302,472. The number of illegal residents in Bulgaria has been estimated at 30,000 to 50,000 people but it is not clear whether they have become illegal or have entered illegally; the discussed survey shows that the majority of informants arrived legally. All this suggests that Bulgaria has been playing a relatively insignificant role in the regional transit migrations.

Nevertheless, illegal migration seemingly intensified through the country, and significantly increased at the Greek border, showing the importance of Greece as a receiving country of - no doubt - clandestine labour. This only proves that Greek parallel economy has been absorbing numerous labour migrants from the post-communist European countries (Romaniszyn 1996, 1997). For the detained Romanian migrants Greece was believed the best place now to find a job; an opinion also shared by Russians and Ukrainians. The detained had attempted to get to Greece illegally after failing to obtain the visa; they also confirmed the possibility to buy the desired travel documents to Greece, which only confirms the existence of the "supportive networks" in Bulgaria. Greece was chosen by 27,1 per cent of the surveyed as preferred destination followed by Germany (16,5 per cent), and France (16,5 per cent).

Among the apprehended in years 1989-1993 the most numerous were, mentioned above, Bulgarians, citizens of Romania (2,304), Turkey (394), and Albania (106). At the beginning of the 1990s illegal crossing attempts had been made by small groups, recently they may include as many as 20-30 or more people. It seems that transit migration increasingly becomes a group process, 60 per cent of interviewed transit migrants have travelled with fiends, family members, and fellow countrymen. This may result from migrants' determination to get away permanently, but on the other hand, it indicates the extensive operation of smuggling networks which "pilot" the crossings. Undoubtedly these people are interested in intensification of the volume of their 'cargo', and hence, may actively agitate for migration. The mass movements have become a lucrative industry for a growing number of various 'specialists' in smuggling people. Their operation may further amplify current migratory flows; according to the survey migrants have obtained information of the target country from those who have already been there, and from the networks organising migration! Also besides liberal entry requirements, convenient geographic location, the network of intermediaries helping with obtaining foreign visas have been the major pulling factors at work which have determined the creation and maintenance of the Bulgarian route.

One substantial migration flow which have crossed Bulgaria at the time of the survey has originated from the Middle East and has been heading to Austria and Germany, the other has come from the Newly Independent States and Romania, and has been heading for Greece. Clients of trafficking networks have departed from Sofia and went through Romania, Hungary or Slovakia to Poland or the Czech Republic from where they try to enter the West. Some transit through Moldova to Ukraine (IOM 1994a: 22) however, it was not established what are their next transit countries. 62 per cent of migrants to Bulgaria are forced to stay there due to

¹⁸ This section is based on the IOM (1994a) research. Carried out in 1993 it concentrated on the highly mobile categories of transit and other migrants, mostly irregular. Respondents were chosen randomly. Since statistical samplings of transients was impossible representative cross sample was made of three broad categories: legal transits, transit migrants and suitcase traders. Altogether 132 interviews were conducted mainly at the borders, supplemented with discussions held with focus groups members. The data does not provide the basis for generalisation but nevertheless, allows to illustrate the phenomenon.

the lack of documents or financial means. Their prolonged stay makes them *de facto* immigrants.

Potential refugees do not apply for refugee status in Bulgaria assuming that their situation as refugees will be much better in the developed West. This and similar examples from other Central and Eastern European countries demonstrates how political and economic incentives of alleged refugees and asylum seekers have been tightly intertwined. All respondents spoke of basic needs to ensure 'survival' in their home country, and this was basic incentive for their migration.

Petty-traders have been identified as a specific category of transit migrants; they have constituted some 14 per cent of the sample. They did not reside, but have been highly mobile transients through Bulgaria, buying and selling goods, and carrying 'stationary' trade in Romania, Ukraine, Greece, and Turkey. They originated from Turkey, Greece, Romania, and the former Soviet Union and from the Middle East. Too much extent their business has been clandestine since majority has entered Bulgaria with tourist vouchers and has not been allowed to engage in business. However, informal contacts established in Bulgaria have facilitated their activity (*ibid.* 41). This again demonstrates that petty-trade requires and leads to the development of the networks. Being an occupation and a source of income then migration, commerce trade nevertheless may lead to future emigration due to funds and information gathered and contacts established.

3.6.3. Conclusions

Migration potential from Bulgaria seems to be relatively low, and emigration potential is very low, but there may be a hidden or postponed migration potential of the second generation encouraged by their parents who, for a number of reasons, have not been able to migrate themselves.

It seems that Bulgaria has become a 'peripheral' transit country in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it has experienced growth of illegal border crossings, especially intensified at Greek/Bulgarian border. This is due to absorbing power of the Greek parallel economy which among other things also attracts Bulgarians themselves.

3.7. Albania

3.7.1. Outflows from Albania¹⁹

In 1992 overwhelming majority of Albanian respondents declared likelihood of both short-term (77 per cent), and/or long-term labour migration (71 per cent), at the same time denying likelihood of their emigration (66 per cent) (IOM 1993:49/51). This shows a 'selective' migration potential: high labour migration potential has been accompanied by low emigration potential. The finding has been consistent with contemporary migration pattern, when temporal migration has exceeded permanent settlement (Salt 1989:448).

Three year later, Albanians have been less optimistic about direction in which their country is heading, 36 per cent defined it 'wrong' as compared to 23 per cent in 1992. This

¹⁹ This section is based on the IOM (1995b) report which compares present results with those obtained in the similar study carried out in 1992. In the most recent research interviews have been carried out with focus group and 993 households. Obtained data allows for cautious generalisations. Additionally data of the IOM previous report has been utilised.

opinion, however, did not refer to national economy alone since only 30 per cent respondents stated 'economic' as the most important problem when compared with 61 per cent in 1992. Also evaluation of one's own family situation varied, it worsened for 22 per cent, was the same for 29 per cent, and improved for 37 per cent of respondents (IOM 1995b: 13/15). These evaluations correspond with declared likelihood of labour out-migration. There it a significant decrease when compared with the year 1992, 57 per cent of respondents did not ruled out their labour migration (71 per cent in 1992), also only 54 per cent have considered short-term migration (77 per cent in 1992) (ibid. 19). The changes may have resulted from perceived improvement in economic status; it may also resulted from bad experiences, and hence less idealised image of their opportunities in the West. 64 per cent of respondents would most likely stay in Albania because of difficulties with going legally to the West, 49 per cent cannot bear social isolation, 47 per cent bad treatment of immigrants, and 48 per cent the lack of respect for Albanians (ibid. 33). Nonetheless still many feel compelled to go to work abroad for economic reasons against restrictions imposed or humiliation experienced. The more inclined to migrate are young, single men with skills or better education.

Statistical data show that in the early 1990s between 300,000-450,000 Albanians left home country which was about 10-14 per cent of the total population (ibid. 9); according to the survey in that time (1992-1995) only a minority of Albanian migrants did so legally. 51 per cent of respondents confessed that their relatives left the country clandestinely (ibid. 36). Strategy adopted by traffickers in the port of Vlora (from which well-established route lead to Italy) proves correct that these people will agitate for migration in order to intensify the volume of their 'cargo', and hence their profits. In Vlora the motorboats owners have started to give guarantees of refunding those unable to reach their destination. Facing little financial risk many decided to try they luck, in effect, daily as many as 450-600 persons were transported from there to Italy (ibid. 11). It is worthy noticing that when asked in 1992 about any contact with 'advisers' on emigration only 15 per cent Albanian respondents confirmed it, and 70 per cent refused to answer or said they did not know whether these people make legal arrangements (IOM 1993:150).

The 'ranking' of the most favourable destinations shows that Italy, the most popular target country in 1992 (27 per cent choices), followed by Germany (26 per cent) and the USA (17 per cent), three years later have been chosen by 15 per cent, Germany by 14 per cent respondents, and the USA was placed on the top with 20 per cent choices (IOM, 1993:59, IOM 1995b: 24). However, majority of those who have returned resided in Greece and Italy (IOM 1995b: 10). Disappearance of Greece from the list of preferred target countries most probably results from bad experiences. There are known firm actions of the Greek police combating clandestine migration from Albania; and a third of those who had returned were either expelled (13 per cent) or refused asylum (20 per cent) (ibid. 35). Nevertheless, still 43 per cent of respondents have relatives abroad, they left in the last three years, and nearly half of them have been living in Greece, and one fifth in Italy (ibid. 10). It means that despite bad experiences strong motivation keep these people in the disliked country. They however, may discourage other to move into this country, and it explains shown the 'dynamics' of preferred target countries.

Nearly half of respondents refused to answer the question about the remittances which may indicate that they do not want to confess receiving money from abroad, those who admitted it get from 200 to 1,000 US\$, yearly (ibid. 11). This explains why migration potential in Albania remains high, and why Western developed countries can expect a continuing flow of legal and illegal migrants from this country.

It is a very significant that there is not labour migration from Albania to better-off Central and Eastern European countries. It only demonstrates that the 'Central and Eastern Europe' is more the label than integrated region. Present, diverse migratory patterns only reveal it. Various ties and geographic proximity make it 'natural' and easy for Albanians to go to neighbouring Greece or Italy then to unknown and alien Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.

3.7.2. Conclusions

Albania does not seem to be a transit country, it however, has a considerable labour migration potential, and despite all bad experiences acquired. Neighbouring southern European countries: Italy and Greece have been important target countries due to their proximity, migration networks, and the operation of traffickers' networks.

3.8. Russia

3.8.1. Outflows from Russia

The open door policy introduced in Russia since the beginning of the 1990s has led to an increase in emigration. In 1990 alone 104,100 persons were granted exit permits when compared with 47,600 persons in the previous year (IOM 1994d: 21). In the following years 1991, 1992, 1993 emigration from this country has stabilised on the very high level, as 90,000, 103,700, and 114,100 persons, respectively, has emigrated from Russia (ibid.). Majority went to Germany, Israel, and the USA, which has stemmed from the high percentage of ethnic Jews and Germans in these outflows. In years 1989-1995 56 per cent Jewish emigration from Russia moved to Germany, when compared with 29,2 per cent who emigrated to Israel, and 9 per cent who has chosen the USA (Polian 1997, Tab.4). Also in recent years Jewish emigration from Russia is heading to Germany although in much smaller number; in 1993 7,8 per cent moved there, in 1994 and 1995 the percentage was 9,8, and 16,4, respectively. Thus on the whole emigration from Russia has an ethnic character. Besides emigration there the country has also experienced economic migration, which overwhelmingly involve ethnic Russians, mostly women (Tiuriukanova 1997:1). However, this phenomenon lacks proper monitoring which would reveal routes, approximated volume, legal status, and other characteristics of these mobility; data concerning labour migration from Russia had not been collected till 1994 (ibid. 7). There seem to be very limited job opportunities for Russians; in 1995 1,000 people got jobs abroad on the basis of bilateral agreements, for another 11,000 job abroad was provided by private firms (ibid. 6). Illegal employment is the other option, generally, accepted by women who undertake domestic jobs abroad; some are involved in so called 'entertainment industry' in Germany, Greece, Israel, the USA and Canada (ibid. 8). The IOM (1993) research on profiles and motives of potential migrants has put the new light on the problem. It has shown a very moderate migration potential, and even lower emigration potential from Russia despite widely perceived and experienced worsening of economic conditions, declared by 55 per cent of respondents (IOM 1993:41). Only 26 per cent interviewed Russians stated the likelihood of their short-term labour migration, lasting a few months; even lower number, 18 per cent, declared the likelihood of long-term labour migration; and as much as 88 per cent rejected the likelihood of their emigration (ibid. 49/51). The more inclined toward long-term labour migration have been young, highly educated people or those with technical training of low

economic status, the unemployed and students. Preferred, detected, destination have been Germany in Europe, the USA and Canada overseas. In Germany in years 1993-1995 from Central and Eastern Europe only migration from the former USSR has been increasing of both non-Germans and ethnic Germans; in 1993 it involved 271,877 persons, in the following years the numbers were 288,022 and 314,116 persons, respectively (Honekopp 1997:5).

3.8.2. Inflows: Russia as a transit country²⁰

In 1994 there were from 300,000 to 500,000 aliens from outside the former USSR in Russia, majority of whom had arrived from developing Asian and African countries. These were overstaying students (between 20,000-60,000), asylum seekers (40,000), overstaying tourists (10,000-50,000), and contract workers (20,000-40,000) (IOM 1994d, 10/11). Besides there were 477,900 registered refugees, and between 1-2,5 million unregistered ones who came from the Caucasus (ibid. 12). Presented figures suggest that the volume of potential transit migrants may be very high.

However, according to the research findings 56 per cent of interviewed want to leave Russia, of whom 17 per cent plan to go home, and only 26 per cent are heading for the West (ibid. 46). This may imply that potential transit migration from Russia is moderate, but due to indicated shortcomings, presented percentage does not allow even for very rough estimations. The increasing number of persons trying to fly from Moscow to the West with invalid documents may indicate overall increase of illegal transit migrants from Russia. Relatively high proportion, 26 per cent, interviewed wanted to stay in Russia, many of whom were Chinese and Vietnamese, involved in small trade and benefiting from coming there. Nevertheless numerous migrants who came with the intention of staying in Russia decided to leave, if possible, due to their uncertain official status and harsh living conditions. 70 per cent interviewed found situation in Russia worse than they had expected, and they would not recommend this country to their compatriots. It may significantly lower the inflows to Russia since, according to all research findings, friends and family members are the most relied source of information of migration opportunities.

Basically the Russian legislature makes admitted migrants illegal ones. On the one hand, liberal entry legislation, and no visa regime for the CIS' citizens provide for huge inflow. On the other hand, migrants have been denied any category of residence permits, and consequently could not acquire a permanent job. Thus, the majority of illegal migrants were created, in a sense, by the inconsistent law. Altogether 43 per cent of the interviewed lack residence permit, and 23 per cent of migrants from the former USSR stay illegally without official residence status (ibid. 34,39).

The main destinations of transients from Russia have been Western European countries, the USA and Canada, and 22 per cent of these migrants already have family in the destination country (ibid. 45/46). In yet another case family networks have revealed their substantial role in the choice of the destination and the transit country, since also a significant number of informants had connections in Russia before their arrival.

The structure of the interviewed was characteristic, and almost identical with that revealed in other countries. Majority was higher educated, young males, employed in their

²⁰ This section is based on the IOM (1994d) report. The study was based on in-depth interviews with 309 migrants carried out in Moscow and St. Petersburg in 1994. Respondents were chosen randomly and the quotas were calculated on the basis of registration lists of asylum seekers. The representativeness of the sample is difficult to assess since the total number of transients is not available, and because the study was limited to the cities.

countries, originating from urban areas, and upper strata of their societies. Only Chinese and Vietnamese claimed they come from poor background and were poorly educated.

3.8.3. Conclusions

Apart from emigration of ethnic minorities (ethnic Germans and Jews), emigration and temporal migration potential from Russia seem to be comparatively low. Labour movements seem to be the most popular among potential and actual migrants whose preferred destination countries have been by far Germany and the USA. However, with its huge number of refugees and aliens - some of who have been unregistered and, hence, unprotected by the state - Russia has a tremendous build-up of potential transit migrants. Moreover, dissatisfaction with situation experienced in Russia, expressed by the majority of the interviewed may be common among migrants there which in turn may accelerate their further migration, legal or not. On the other hand, this may also lead to the lowering of further inflows as potential migrants to Russia may be discouraged by those who had already come.

4. Interim Conclusions

4.1. The main theses recapitulated

1) Transit migration increasingly becomes a group process; this suggests the greater determination to settle abroad, and the development of trafficking networks' agitation aimed at the increase of the volume of their 'cargo'. These networks are international, organised activity of co-ordinated local groups, with developed strategies and accumulated financial resources. It demonstrates that mass movements have become a lucrative industry. Their operation and agitation amplify current migratory flows, as the Vlora case, in Albania, clearly shows.

2) The postponed migration potential revealed in Bulgaria may also lie in other eastern European states.

3) Migration may be patterned by a 'spread-of-infection' rule; i.e. migrants follow the examples of the others, as the Romas' case show.

4) Potential refugees passing through central European countries do not apply for refugee status there, assuming their situation, as refugees would be much better in the developed West. This discloses how political and economic incentives merge.

5) Emergence of a novel migratory pattern in Ukraine of shopping tours to 'Russian bazaars' in neighbouring Poland, Romania and their quick evolution into 'professional' trade show the dynamics of migratory movements within the region.

6) Migration networks direct migration flows since they help to permeate into the target countries, and to establish themselves there. Personal networks build-up in the Western democracies in the labour importing period serve as a powerful mechanism which puts into motion the chain migration mechanism, and hence pulls in new potential migrants.

7) The most entrepreneurial migrants in the region seem to be the Chinese who prefer self-employment and occupy economic niches of the national economy of the receiving country.

8) The popular mode of spending remittances - on improving living conditions, consumption goods, and investments - shows that economic migration is a function of both economic necessity and consumption desires, fashions, and obligations.

9) Petty-trade may be the first stage of migration, as a source of funds, information and migration experience, and a way of entering into contacts necessary for longer trips and/or future migration. Furthermore, petty-traders' constant mobility establishes microstructures which link societies involved.

10) Inconsistent immigration laws which permit entry and denies resident and/or work permits in many Central and Eastern European countries leads to the build-up of the stock of immigrants.

4.2. The structure and nature of migration movements in Central and Eastern Europe

Gaps still existing in migration studies on Central and Eastern Europe which need bridging are: clandestine labour migration within and from the region; migration flows experienced outside metropolitan areas; and migration in countries so far neglected by researchers. This gaps along with the fact that for various, explained, reasons analysed data have not been fully representative limit theorising. Nevertheless, it seems that the large collection of the diverse data studied in this paper allow for careful generalisations.

A characteristic feature of migration patterns in all studied countries is a 'selective' migration potential: a high labour migration potential has been accompanied by a low emigration potential. This exemplifies contemporary migration pattern of the predominance of temporal migration over permanent settlement (emigration). The phenomenon creates some conceptual problems. Traditionally anthropologists have been thinking of migration as a one-way process (usually rural-urban). However, facts and closer analyses of migratory processes have altered this view; they have revealed that migrations are not exclusively one-way, and the new forms have developed such as return migration or pendulum migration. Also, a rather arbitrary duration criterion of migration adopted by some theorists 'invalidates' facts, or 'ignores' them, since a significant number of current migration flows last less than a month. Visible facts render us to adopt inclusive definition of international migration as all non-tourist movements/flows irrespective to their duration, intentions, and character.

The key pushing factor seems to be frustration with the economic situation in the home country matched with perceptions of high living standards in the West; the latter being the major pulling factor. Additionally, kin/friendship networks amplifies migration. A typical, actual or potential, migrant in the region is a young, single male, either highly educated or with technical skills, often an unemployed or a student.

A number of different reasons, enumerated in this paper, have opened up a new migration space in Central and Eastern Europe which have been crossed by the diverse types of migration flows. The following broad types of migration flows moving across the new migratory space of the CEE region have been distinguished: the westward directed transit migrations, legal and illegal; the westward directed labour migrations, legal and illegal; the westward directed emigration; the westward directed involuntary migration of refugees and asylum seekers; the regional petty-trade mobility, generally illegal; the regional labour migration, both legal and undocumented; the eastward petty-trade mobility; and the eastward labour movements. Enumerated types are not exclusive, since migrants may 'switch' from one activity to another in the course of his/her migration. Westward directed labour movements have been heading both for the Western, and for central European democracies. Eastward labour and petty-trade migration has been heading for Russia. In those types of migration flows take part both citizens of Central and Eastern European states, and non-European migrants from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. A specific category form inflows of the highly skilled from the West into the region.

The analysed data allow to assume that the most popular European destination for economic and 'involuntary' migrants heading for the West from Central and Eastern Europe or from outside it (who only pass through the region) have been Germany. In central Europe Poland, the Czech Republic and to much smaller extent Hungary have been the main target countries, chosen by economic migrants - by which I understand migrant workers, petty-traders, and labour migrants - and involuntary migrants, both from the former USSR, and Asian developing countries. In Eastern Europe emerging job opportunities in Russia pull in numerous economic migrants, particularly from Ukraine; numerous refugees and asylum seekers have also swarmed the country from non-European countries. Southern European states - Greece and Italy - appear as yet another new 'migration centre', on the continent, which pulls in economic migrants from eastern Europe, generally from Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria and Albania. Clandestine labour migration to these countries from Poland probably has stabilised on the low level after the boom years of the late 1980s.

Listed above, regular and irregular migration, legal and clandestine, experienced and generated by Central and Eastern European countries have already structured a new European migration space and linked it with Western European migration space. Hence the questions arise whether the newly opened up space may be seen as integrating into the European one, in other words, whether there is one European migration space now expanding to Central and Eastern Europe? And whether and in what sense observed migration space or spaces may be portrayed as a migration system or systems? To answer the question chosen migration theories need to be examined.

4.3. Theoretical context

As I have long been arguing (Romaniszyn 1995, 1996, 1997) the complexity of the migration phenomenon demands a complex theoretical approach provided by existing theoretical perspectives seen as complementary not conflicting. This assumption justifies the application of the various approaches for the explanation of the discussed problem.

The concept of 'migration system' understood as "two or more places linked by flows and counterflows of people" (Fawcett 1989:671, Boyd 1989:641) is not new in migration studies and can be attributed to structural perspectives. However, there is little consensus about what constitutes a 'migration system' approach. On the one hand, systems theory, which relies on the assumption of equilibrium, and holds that variables should not be analysed in isolation but rather for their interrelation as part of a system, has been seen as adequate for migration system analysis (Kanasoglou, et al. 1986). For at least two reasons this approach is very problematic; first of all the definitions of the boundaries of a given system are problematic; whether and on what basis a given system can be seen as a closed, not an open one? Also the equilibrium assumption raises serious difficulties. On the other hand, migration system approach has been pursued through analyses of the linkages and networks seen as an expression of the system operation. As Monica Boyd argues approaching migration from a system perspective focuses attention on stability and movement in sending and receiving areas; allows to examine flows within the context of other flows; and emphasises that flows of people are part of, and are influenced by flows of goods, services and information. Thus the attention has been paid to linkages between sending and receiving areas. As John Salt puts it: "we may regard the network of flows as one expression of system operation. ... Analyses of these networks involve identifying the characteristics of the systems in which they reside." (Salt 1989: 440/441). For the author the series of networks can be regarded as geographical migration systems (ibid. 432). Also James Fawcett puts forward a conceptual framework for, as

he names them, the nonpeople linkages in international migration systems; in fact providing the framework for the migration systems' analysis (Fawcett 1989). In sum, the authors assume that the flows of people are a prerequisite to defining a migration system, and point at migrant networks, and nonpeople linkages as factors which constitute migration systems. It implies that both forms of linkages should be seen as indicators of the particular migration system(s). Hence the analyses of these linkages are necessary for, and lead to the characteristics of the system(s). In other words, migration networks and nonpeople links - which construct migration system(s) - serve as the means for its (their) explanation.

Migration networks have been considered as 'personal' or 'individual', based on family, friendship and community ties. These simple structures have the potential to evolve into more complex mechanisms as migration system(s) evolve (Gurak, Caces 1992:151). The nonpeople linkages have been categorised as observable (e.g. trade flows), and conceptual (e.g. economic dependency), regulatory and relational (Fawcett 1989:673). The network analysis, like the analysis of linkages still needs further development. Research agendas involve the form and function of networks/linkages across types of migration, types of cultures, political contexts, etc. In other words, how do they vary by ethnic, policy contexts, and by types of flows?

Insufficiency of conceptualisation of the migration network approach has resulted in the lack of the advanced knowledge on types and structures of the networks, reported in presented studies. Majority of them just pointed at existence and significance of migrant and/or traffickers networks in directing migration flows; in one case personal, kin networks have been studied showing their role in shaping and sustaining migration along developed routes (Jaźwińska, Okólski, 1996). On the whole, the networks, which facilitate petty-traders, have been thoroughly neglected, even despite clear traces of their existence (see page 24). Hence, a study on shuttle traders in central Europe²¹ which gave more insight into the nature of the networks facilitating petty-trade appears as a breakthrough. It distinguishes three kinds of social relationships build up between persons involved in this activity: horizontal, symmetrical ties, reciprocity like; vertical, non-symmetrical ties patterned by client-patron relationships; horizontal, non-symmetrical ties, either ad hoc or renewed (Wallace et al. 1997:38/39).

The migrant network approach has been criticised for neglecting structural settings in which networks operate. An institutional perspective (Goss and Lindquist 1995) - which can be seen as development of the network approach - renders scholars sensitive to resources and rules of access to overseas employment; their mobilisation has been defined as the institutionalisation of migration. The approach is believed to allow for the analysis of the dynamics of international migration. It was designed as the framework for further research on international labour migration which, of course, constitute just one form of current migratory flows. It is, however, worthy considering the usefulness of the approach for the analysis of the traffickers' networks: whether and to what extent they can be interpreted as international, 'supportive' institutions with specific rules and resources? These networks have been widely reported by all studies discussed above, however, only research carried out in the Czech Republic (IOM 1994c) provided more insight into the structure of these networks.

A still broader framework for the analysis provides the global system theories. They render researchers sensitive to links between the levels of communication and transportation - accompanied by imbalance in living standards - and the migration potential from less developed countries (Miller, Denmark 1993). Indeed, the discussed studies clearly show

²¹ The research was undertaken in the Czech Republic (1993/1995), in Hungary (1996), Poland, and Slovakia. Interviews carried out in a 'natural', possible, way were collected where possible (stations, queues). They were supplemented by reports from involved researchers, summaries of laws and official statistics in each country; see: Wallace, et al. 1997.

correlation between: a/ developed transportation systems between capital cities of Central and Eastern European countries and numerous places in developing countries; b/ an easy access to detailed information about opportunities in the target countries, provided by friends and relatives, and the migration flows to, and from the region (e.g. IOM 1994a, 1994d). Globalization has also been conceptualised as a process of structural transformation of the global political economy, which connects migrants to two or more societies, thus these migrants are referred to as 'transmigrants' (Wong 1997:330). Indeed, some migrants reported by the presented studies, in particular some Chinese who have established themselves in central European countries (IOM 1995c), as well as the highly skilled moving from the West to the East (Rudolph and Hillmann, 1997), may already belong to the category of transmigrants. Yet another macro-structural perspective which provide a broader context for the analysis of the presented research findings refers to the patterns of the spatial mobility characteristic for the present state of development, described by some as post-Fordism, and by others as disorganised or information - based capitalism. The characteristic feature of post-organised capitalism's migrations is that they have been heading for the cities of the advanced societies, and immigrants have been concentrated in manufacturing, retail, and consumer services in the global cities. To some extent the research findings confirm these tendencies: a majority of the reported flows have been heading for the capital cities of the Central and Eastern Europe; also a significant number of informants have been involved in retail. On the other hand, reported: labour migration to agriculture, and near-the-boarder trade is inconsistent with reported global migration trends.

I assume that the reflections on consumption provide a new, valuable theoretical context for the further explanation of economic migrations, which constitute the majority of the contemporary flows (Romaniszyn 1996, 1997). As viewed from this perspective consumption appears as a meaningful and powerful social activity which serves the making and maintaining of social relationships and networks. The establishment of local standards of consumption along with strong consumption pressure 'puts into motion' those who are not able to meet them; this creates migration drive. Indeed, driven by economic necessity economic migrants, nevertheless move also in order to meet established and/or desired consumption standards. This composes so far ignored cultural pushing factor.

4.4. New, regional quasi-migration systems

On the whole, migration flows experienced by Central and Eastern European countries perceived in a broad theoretical context may be seen as consistent with trends characteristic for global migration flows. This allows us to expect their persistence. As have already been pointed out the former flows have structured a new migratory space opened up in Central and Eastern Europe, and some of them (i.e. labour migration, legal and illegal) have linked the region with western and southern European countries by constant flows and counterflows of people, supported and directed by well developed migration networks. Presented theories compel us to reconsider a conclusion of the new migration space; we have already arrived at. If we adopt the 'weaker' notion of a migration system as 'two or more places linked by flows and counterflows of people' we can recognise and distinguish a number of migration systems in Europe. Of course, given the fact that the analysed data have not been fully representative, and that we have chosen the weaker 'migration system' notion it is more adequate to assume the emergence of geographical areas, closely linked by circular migration flows which may be named quasi-migration systems.

Thus, constant flows and counterflows of petty-traders and labour migrants between Poland, the Czech Republic on the one hand, and Ukraine, Lithuania, and Russia, on the other have established central European quasi-migration system, amplified by the following nonpeople links: bilateral agreements on legal labour recruitment, the legislation which enables movements; community acceptance of migrants (regulatory linkages); disparities in level of development, and a certain degree of similarity between languages (relational linkage). Constant, clandestine economic migration from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and to some extent from Poland to Greece and Italy creates another quasi-migration system, a southern one, amplified by the complementarity of labour supply and demand in the parallel sector, and disparities in the level of development (relational linkages). Constant circulation of clandestine and legal labour migrants between Poland, Ukraine, Russia, and to a lesser extent, Hungary and Lithuania, and the Western European countries, in particular, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the highly skilled migration from Western Europe into the former countries link these places into another quasi-migration system. It is further amplified by a worker recruitment system implementation (Germany), student exchanges (regulatory linkages), the complementarity of labour supply and demand, also in the parallel sector, and disparities in the level of development (relational linkages). Finally, reported circulation of petty-traders and migrant workers between Ukraine, the NIS countries, and Russia establish yet another, eastern quasi-migration system, amplified by complementarity of labour supply and demand, and a high degree of similarity between cultures and languages (relational linkages).

Besides, reported, personal networks which direct flows and counterflows of migrants to the specified areas, and the enumerated nonhuman linkages which further unite these areas into a quasi-migration systems, there have been obvious hindrances which tend to isolate them. These are treaties, like the Schengen one which imply exclusive immigration policies adopted by the EU countries; these also are various social forms of exclusion, like racism or xenophobia which can be traced in some western European democracies. They effectively curb actual and potential flows, especially from eastern European countries due to visa regimes, and perceived social isolation and bad treatment of migrants (IOM 1994a, IOM 1997b)

Emerging European migration systems are quasi-systems also because they may dissolve almost overnight due to the provisional character of the flows, which currently link these areas. Additionally, breaks in some nonpeople linkages, which now connect these groups of countries, would have the same effect. Petty-trade which composes a significant share of the flows has often been seen by those involved as a shameful activity, to which one was forced to resort in order to make ends meet (Wallace, et al. 1997:9). This suggests that this form of mobility is very provisional and temporal. On the other hand, the emergence of 'professional' traders in Ukraine), and the reported fact that petty-trade often serves as the first step in migration show that some persons currently involved in petty-trade may become transmigrants whose movements will sustain the emerging systems and/or establish the new ones. Similarly economic pushing factors which presently generate economic migration, in time may evolve into cultural ones, such as the above mentioned consumption pressure which could drive out other people anxious to meet established consumption standards.

Finally, as shown, there have been more than just one European migration space or quasi-migration system recently expanding to the east, nor there have been two separate systems, western and eastern one. In fact, a number of different quasi-systems have appeared. This substantially contributes to deeper intra-regional diversification in Europe. Hence a globalisation process, which generates migration, flows, transmigrants, and widens migration spaces, has been balanced by the opposite - no less real - tendencies which divers and

multiplies migration spaces. Apparently, Central and Eastern European countries have been subjected to both of them.

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